Nuclear Security in South Asia: Pakistan’s Progress and India’s Unresolved Challenges
In 2026, Pakistan crossed another hurdle by securing its position as one of the secured country to have nuclear capability. The achievement took place on 9 October 2026, when IAEA announced the completion of its first International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission to Pakistan. This review marked an important step in Pakistan’s engagement with international nuclear security assessment. Its significance lies not in conferring a security certificate, but rather in subjecting elements of the national framework to international expert scrutiny. Pakistan’s nuclear security cooperation with the IAEA has evolved considerably since the Nuclear Security Cooperation Program established in 2005. The program supported training, radiation-detection capabilities, border controls and improvements to the protection of facilities housing radioactive sources. However, the same effort by the IAEA failed in India miserably. Therefore, to understand this journey, it is important to note how, Pakistan has over the time improved its nuclear safety, even with declining economic conditions. On the contrary, India, which is a well-known growing economic hub and one of the biggest market with stable political ground continues to have nuclear incidents. These incidents are not only of single dimension but of multiple dimension which include theft, leakages, discarding of radioactive material and many more.
Although it was noted in the IAEA’s International Conference on Nuclear Security in May 2024, 31 Indian nuclear facilities were under IAEA safeguards, alongside 25 operational Radiation Emergency Response Centers. However, many nuclear incidents continued to happen till date, providing evidence of the security gaps that are still pertaining in India’s Nuclear safety protocols. These incidents have been happening since they attained the nuclear capability, on 31 March 1993, A turbine-blade failure at Narora Atomic Power Station in Uttar Pradesh led to damage involving the generator’s hydrogen and lubricating-oil systems, causing a fire and loss of electrical power. The series of accidents does not stop there, in April 2010 in Delhi, a used cobalt-60 gamma irradiator was improperly discarded and was thrown casually in the scrap-metal compromising the basic nuclear safety exposing public to the dangerous radiations. Then, Kakrapar reactor pressure-tube leaks in 2015-2016 led to need of post-incident safety reviews and improvements in regulatory requirements.
Other than the incidents of the leaks and radiations issues, India’s Nuclear security was compromised and in the events of theft multiple times. The incidents include, Mumbai 7 kg of natural uranium seizer on May 2021, carried by two men only. Another incident includes, Thane depleted uranium case, on December 2016 Police seized approximately 8.86 kg of depleted uranium from two men. Then, Dehradun suspected radioactive device case that happened in July 2024, where the police arrested five men, on the sale of a radiography camera bearing the name of India’s Board of Radiation and Isotope Technology, associated with the DAE and BARC. The cases of uranium theft from mining areas continued till date. In one of the incidents it was described that the 1994 theft in Meghalaya, involved a politician who possessed uranium, and was reportedly trafficking it towards Nepal and Bangladesh in 2008.
However, Pakistan has persistently been performing and cooperating with the IAEA protocols to keep its Nuclear program safe. Pakistan has pursued a different but increasingly visible route through NISAS, PCENS and its first IPPAS mission. Both countries participate in the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment; India ratified the Amendment in 2007 and Pakistan in 2016. Both also participate in the international conventions on early notification of nuclear accidents and assistance in nuclear or radiological emergencies. Pakistan’s next task is to translate international engagement into sustained regulatory effectiveness, continuing peer review and demonstrable improvements in the protection of nuclear and radioactive materials. India can pursue similar transparency within appropriate security limits. Neither country needs to disclose operational vulnerabilities to strengthen confidence: regular institutional reporting, follow-up on expert recommendations and practical emergency communication would be meaningful steps.
To conclude, in South Asia, nuclear security is not merely a national responsibility. Its consequences cross borders. Therefore, other than Pakistan Nuclear safety, IAEA should also emphasize on taking strict measures against India to secure the region from nuclear incidents.