Beijing’s Free Ride in the Red Sea Is Running Out
Over the past 20 years, China has been practicing a sort of diplomatic minimalism in the Middle East: purchase the oil, construct the ports, preach the peace, and let somebody else pay for the security. It’s been a success so far. It is also running short of road as well. With the Houthis continuing to launch attacks against Saudi Arabia, one issue that has long been on think-tank panels has now been thrust before everyone: should China re-think its policy on the Houthis? I think the answer is yes and the sooner Beijing realizes that, it will be cheaper.
Arithmetic of Arm’s length
Make sure to begin with the numbers. Saudi Arabia is the second biggest oil supplier to China, supplying about 14 per cent of the kingdom’s crude imports. A drone attack on an airport or an oil facility in Saudi Arabia by Houthis is thus not “someone else’s war”. The end result falls on Chinese balance sheets.
The political situation is no different. Beijing’s preferred posture – friend to all – was nearly impossible to maintain since the US-Iraqi war against Iran began in February with Tehran’s aggressive attacks on its Arab neighbours and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. According to the same analysis, China’s China–Arab States Summit has even been postponed indefinitely. If your flagship diplomatic event is not happening, this balancing act isn’t going according to plan.
Hedging has a price
What exactly is the China’s policy? When put together, it appears to be a hedged enclosures on 3 rows. Beijing is requesting restraint in public but in the words of the United Nations (UN) Security Council on 9 October it reiterated its support for the Yemen internationally recognised government and its support of the sovereignty of both Yemen and Saudi Arabia. In private, Reuters reported that China had been discussing with the Houthis, with the help of Iran, to get clearance for its own tankers. Following a direct Saudi request in September, Beijing made an indirect request to Iran to curtail the Houthis.
All steps are logical. When combined, it’s a not-so-pleasing pattern: “Keep Chinese ships safe, ask politely and don’t get entangled in the middle. Some analysts push it even further. A policy of “silent support” has been in place at the Stimson Center, and the center has also alleged that China-based technology is now inside the group, which is classified under the term “dual-use.” Those are accusations and not indisputable truths; Beijing has a right to challenge them. Perception is a factor in diplomacy. There was no great power that wanted to be an indispensable economic partner of the Gulf and, at the same time, the country from which the supply chains of drones came.
A safe-passage deal is NOT a strategy.
A private arrangement for Chinese tankers is best thought of as an insurance policy. It’s not a protection of area but a protection of cargo. It also does not align with the fact that the Houthis have declared the closure of the Bab al-Mandab Strait for the passage of Saudi ships. What used to be an open waterway is no longer a stable trade route, it’s a protection racket in need of renegotiation.
But Beijing cannot be helpless either. One of its most significant oil suppliers is Iran, and Iranian diplomacy is not to be taken lightly. But it has been reported that the Chinese made the request to Iran without any pressure or threats. Any leverage not used is just wasted leverage. It’s fair to say that Iran can only exert some influence over the Houthis and that China can’t solve a crisis that is defined by Washington, Tehran, Tel Aviv and Riyadh all simultaneously. We can’t do everything is an inadequate justification for doing virtually nothing.
What re-thinking would look like
Rethinking does not translate to a defence pact or Chinese warships chasing drones. China has never signed such an agreement with Riyadh, and there’s no reason to begin now. There should be four steps to a sensible shift.
The first is to shift from the private request to coordinated pressure. Beijing should make it clear, along with other Gulf countries, that it will not tolerate Iran’s allies, and the consequences of that should be made clear. Second, patrol their own community. A tighter ban on the export of components for dual-use would be a painless move for China and would be a repudiation of the worst charge against it. Thirdly, do not take the Security Council for granted. Chinese influence over the wording is preferable to Chinese abstention from participating in the council’s action against the Houthis, which have been calling on Beijing to join the council. Fourth, provide defensive support, in the form of air-defence cooperation which the Gulf states already practice in Chinese fashion. Cost is one of the issues with interceptors, and cheap is not. Riyadh’s issue is partly one of arithmetic, and Chinese industry might be able to make it easier for the Saudis.
Why Pakistan should care
The debate is not just at Islamabad but is also at Beijing’s level. Pakistan has become China’s neighbour and close ally while through the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan is Saudi Arabia’s formal military partner since September 2025. It also signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement with Riyadh and Türkiye in August, a move which many experts including Chinese believe is part of Saudi Arabia’s diversification of defence partnerships.
That diversification conveys a message for Beijing. If China does not assist Riyadh, Riyadh will turn to France, Britain, Pakistan and Türkiye and Chinese influence in the Gulf will slowly begin to fade. The stakes are even higher for Pakistan, as it does not want to play both sides against each other. A China that is visibly active on Saudi security makes Islamabad’s balancing act less and less difficult. Pakistan’s capabilities to carry that argument are strong and it has the trust of both capitals.
The principle and the cost of the product
Those in favor of the present line of action will resort to the 5 Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the first of which is Non-Interference. An accurate and old observation. However, when the fighting was far away and the oil flowed, non-interference was a much simpler principle to observe. Now it is the turn of China’s deeply cherished refineries, shipping lanes and summit calendars to take the beating. Rules that say that such costs must be endured end up becoming habits.
The cornerstone of China’s Middle East policy was to be everybody’s friend and nobody’s guarantor. A war-torn area is now checking that deal. Beijing has no need to become a combatant, but it has to become a participant. At present, the free ride in the Red Sea is over, and it is better for China to make its decision than it would be for it to be made for them.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Opinion Desk.
