Religious Conflict vs. State Maturity: How Pakistan Avoided Iran’s Fate
The recent Iran-U.S. tensions have once again fully exposed the reality that the religious leadership of the Muslim world is trapped in certain fundamental misconceptions of political insight. Instead of resolving any crisis, these misconceptions give birth to a new conflict every few years. Iran’s recent experience is a clear example of this.
If we examine this entire matter emotional reactions, it becomes evident that the problem is not about a single event, attack, or government. Rather, it is about a long-term mindset, political approach, and strategy, where matters were viewed from a particular angle and decisions were made accordingly. The results of this way of thinking and acting are now fully emerging. Considering the behavior of religious leadership and this entire experience, the summary can be presented in three basic points:
1. Viewing political conflicts through a religious lens.
2. Dealing with world powers on the basis of idealism.
3. Ignoring present realities while lost in the glory of the past.
It is undeniable that Iran linked its regional role to a religious and revolutionary narrative. Thus, political conflicts did not remain merely political or geographical; they became a sacred struggle, an ideological front, and part of a grand historical project. Behind this concept was a religious imagination that hoped to establish a sphere of influence across the region and ultimately bring about a global system of justice that would emerge after the appearance of Imam Mahdi. This mindset gave foreign policy ideological sanctity instead of realism. The result was that political decisions became subservient to a grand religious dream, rather than ground realities, the balance of power, or diplomatic possibilities.
This imagination not only included hope for a future just system but also linked certain religious and political differences from the early periods of Islamic history to the present with a consciousness that carried a sense of historical settlement with deviants. Thus, present politics was molded into a mixture of past memories, devotion, and a psychology of revenge.
This is why Iran over the past several decades has not remained just a state, but has also emerged as a hub of various armed networks, proxy groups, and regional organizations. Armed groups active in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and other regions, as well as networks established in various areas, became part of this policy. The affiliations of Hamas, Houthis, Hezbollah, Fatimiyoun, Zainabiyoun, and the IRGC itself have been part of this larger map. This temporarily gave Iran a certain kind of influence, but it also created intense fear and insecurity among other regional states, especially Arab countries. For them, the threat was no longer just Israel, but also a neighbor that wanted to extend its ideological sphere of influence beyond its borders. In this context, many Arab countries strengthened ties with external powers, gave military bases, and not only tolerated but sometimes considered the presence of global powers necessary for their security. Therefore, understanding the American or Western presence in the region merely as imperialistic desire is insufficient; there is also a real history of regional fear behind it. The bloody crises regarding Hajj and Mecca further deepened this feeling within Arab states that Iran’s revolutionary style of politics could affect the balance of the entire region.
The second fundamental problem with Iran’s policy was that it mostly dealt with world powers in an ideological and revolutionary language, while international politics operates on power, interests, order, and balance, more than principles. For fifty years, the narrative of “Death to America,” “Death to Israel,” and the “Great Satan” was maintained. The people were made to feel that this was a historical resistance, a great civilizational advance, and that its outcome would eventually be the decline of world powers. But looking at the results, this policy proved completely unsuccessful with respect to its fundamental objective. Neither did America weaken, nor did Israel cease to exist, nor did the global system change. On the contrary, Iran itself became increasingly afflicted with sanctions, economic pressure, diplomatic isolation, and internal unrest. The real question is: if after half a century the opponent stands stronger than before, and you yourself become more constrained and confined from within, then what remains as the criterion for the success of slogans? And when the same world powers impose their own terms and guarantee peace, whose success is that?
Another reality needs to be understood here. The ethical principles, rules of war, negotiations, ceasefires, human rights, and legal justification that the world speaks of today – their origin largely lies in the fact that the very global victors themselves imposed certain restrictions upon themselves. It is true that where their superiority faces a real challenge, they also deviate from these principles. Yet despite this, it is also a reality that today’s global environment is relatively more civilized compared to previous eras of human history. Now at least there exists the capacity for negotiations instead of war, coexistence instead of complete annihilation, and political compromise instead of conflict. That is why in the modern world, solutions to conflicts are sought not in the dream of completely eliminating the opponent, but in a tolerable political arrangement. Political conflicts are resolved politically, not by dreaming of the opponent’s total annihilation. Here too, Iran’s policy seems behind the times, because it kept alive the dream of total annihilation instead of coexistence.
Recent events have also exposed the real balance of power. The manner in which targets were hit using modern technology, intelligence, air superiority, and organized attacks, and leadership was eliminated, made it clear that the disparity developing in economics, defense, technology, and state capacity is not minor. The side from which the attack came remained secure with its capital, technology, military organization, and global backing, while the region made the battlefield of this conflict suffered greater losses and its surrounding Muslim states, societies, and peoples bore the damage. Neither did the actual power’s economy shake, nor did any fundamental difference occur in its military capability. On the other side, religious circles once again generated enthusiasm as if we are close to the demise of a great global power, but the practical outcome was the same as has repeatedly occurred: eventually, they had to come to the same table where the real balance of power is already decisive, and accept demands within the limits already predetermined by ground realities. Much noise is made, but the end always occurs on the real map of power.
The Iranian people themselves have also paid a significant price for this entire experience. Sanctions impacted the economy, currency came under pressure, uncertainty grew among the younger generation, internal unrest increased, and a large portion of state resources continued to be spent on external fronts and ideological priorities. Thus, on one hand, the glory of the revolution was maintained, while on the other, the practical needs of the people’s economy, welfare, employment, internal stability, and institutional development lagged behind. This is where a fundamental difference becomes understandable: revolution and state are not the same thing. A revolution can run on slogans, sacrifice, conflict, and continuous passionate agitation, but states run on economy, order, institution-building, diplomacy, and lasting balance. When a state does not move beyond the temperament of a permanent revolution, it eventually begins to limit its own possibilities.
Against this backdrop, the real question is: what is the definition of success? Is success the emergence of a few armed networks, the creation of fear in the region, and a temporary increase in influence? Or is success that a state becomes a guarantor of a strong economy, stable institutions, secure borders, better global standing, credible diplomacy, and a dignified future for its people? If the second criterion is adopted, then Iran’s fifty-year experience must be re-examined. Because the real measure of success is not raising loud slogans against an enemy, but creating a safe and dignified life for one’s own society.
In contrast, if we look at Pakistan’s experience, some positive aspects emerge. Although Pakistan has always protected its interests in a complex environment, overall it did not turn its political conflicts into full-scale religious wars. It maintained realistic relations with world powers instead of complete confrontation, and focused on gradually strengthening its defense needs. This very approach gave it reprieve and practical leeway, allowing it to carve out space for itself while remaining within the global system. It even succeeded in acquiring nuclear capability for its security. This success was not the result of emotional slogans, a revolutionary dream, or any immediate adventurism, but rather the fruit of a long, quiet, realistic, and state-oriented policy.
Another aspect worthy of particular consideration in Pakistan’s context is that here, religious forces have often tried to persuade the state to adopt the same kind of emotional and confrontational strategy that can be seen in Iran’s behavior. They want to put the state on a path where political conflicts become religious battles, dealing with world powers is based on slogans and passion rather than realism, and national strategy is subjugated to an emotional atmosphere full of temporary fervor but lacking state interests and long-term outcomes. But thankfully, the people of Pakistan, its political forces, and especially the practical seriousness and institutional maturity present within Pakistan’s army have largely blocked the path to getting swept away by this emotional current. This very maturity has repeatedly prevented Pakistan from fully embarking on the path of slogans, religious frenzy, and unrealistic confrontation the consequences of which are now before us in the experiences of others. In this regard, Pakistan’s experience teaches that national security, defense strategy, and international relations cannot be entrusted to emotions; they require cool-headedness, a realistic vision, and state maturity.
If any major lesson emerges from this entire experience, it is that in today’s world, political conflicts must be viewed through political factors rather than religious sanctification. We must deal with world powers based on practical balance rather than mere moral oratory. Instead of hiding present weaknesses in dreams of past glory, we must understand our real position, real resources, and real possibilities. Some Arab states largely adopted this realistic approach. This is the path that gives nations reprieve, gives them room to breathe, and gives them the opportunity to build their future. Without this, emotional narratives remain alive, but states keep weakening. And those states that understand the changing principles of time and carve out a suitable path for themselves are the ones that ultimately reach a more sustainable position of survival, dignity, and strength.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Opinion Desk.
