Reforming the NSG in a Multipolar Nuclear Order
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is once again at an inflection point. The deadlock over further enlargement in 2025 has exposed a structural weakness that has long hovered over the body. Under the same framework, two nuclear powers have been treated differently. On the one hand, India has received exceptional treatment in the form of a nuclear trade waiver, but on the other hand, Pakistan access to civilian nuclear trade has been denied
The NSG was established in 1975 in response to India’s nuclear weapon test in 1974 to prevent nuclear export and proliferation. That purpose remains relevant. However, the political environment in which the group now operates is profoundly different from the one in which it was created. The nuclear order is no longer hierarchical in the old sense. It is multipolar, competitive, and defined by uneven standards. In such an environment, institutions survive not merely by preserving tradition but by demonstrating fairness, transparency, consistency, and universal rules.
That is where the NSG has begun to falter. The absence of objective, universally accepted criteria for membership makes accession debates vulnerable to political bargaining. States are now judged not only on technical and non-proliferation credentials but on who supports them, who opposes them, and what regional equations they represent. To put this into perspective, India secured a waiver of the NSG through intensive lobbying by the United States and the Indo-US civil nuclear deal of 2008, which paved the way for this, despite India not being a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Currently, the NSG guidelines are the main obstacle. The regulation restricts states that are not parties to the NPT from becoming NSG members. In India’s case, this rule was violated in granting the country an NSG waiver. Evidently, the US geopolitical interests in the region and India`s increased role in the US strategic calculus led to these developments in the early twenty-first century.
The international community should adopt a rational approach towards the prevailing security environment of South Asia. Hence, Pakistan has long argued that any consideration of NSG enlargement must be based on a non-discriminatory approach for all, treating all non-NPT members equally. That position is not a plea for special treatment; it is a demand for institutional consistency. If the NSG is to retain credibility, it cannot operate through selective accommodation and political exceptionalism, as in the case of India.
Pakistan’s interest in the NSG is driven by its energy crisis, which it can address effectively through the NSG. A responsible nuclear State with a credible export-control regime, a mature regulatory architecture, and a remarkable record of non-proliferation compliance should not be excluded merely because the process lacks agreed rules. The issue is not whether Pakistan deserves membership by assertion. The issue is whether the NSG is prepared to define, in advance, what responsible conduct actually means.
This distinction matters. In the absence of criteria, the debate over membership becomes hostage to geopolitics. That is precisely what has happened over the years, with the result that the NSG’s procedural ambiguity has become a source of strategic tension. A regime that governs access to nuclear commerce cannot afford to look arbitrary. Once it does, it ceases to be seen as a rules-based institution and begins to resemble a club.
Pakistan would therefore be well advised to shift the terms of the debate. Rather than treating the NSG question as a narrow accession campaign, Islamabad should frame it as an institutional reform issue. The central argument should be that the Group’s own integrity requires unbiased criteria-based approach rather than a country-specific criterion. Such a framework would not only be fairer but also more functional. It would reduce uncertainty, narrow the scope for political manipulation, and strengthen the regime’s non-proliferation purpose.
Pakistan’s policy posture must also remain calm and disciplined. The NSG is a technically important institution, but it is also highly political. Pakistan’s best strategy is therefore one of patient advocacy, technical credibility, and principled consistency. The message should be simple: if the NSG wants to remain relevant in a multipolar order, it must become more unbiased about the standards it applies and more consistent in its application.
For Pakistan, the challenge is to ensure that its legitimate interests are not diluted in a system that rewards ambiguity. That can best be done by insisting on “none or all” biased objective criteria, documenting Pakistan’s credentials, and making the case that institutional reform is in the interest of the NSG itself. A fairer framework would not only serve Pakistan; it would strengthen the broader non-proliferation regime.
The lesson of the 2025 deadlock is therefore clear. A consensus-based body without agreed, unbiased criteria is not sustainable in the long run. If the NSG wishes to preserve its credibility, it must modernize its procedures and reduce the scope for political discretion. Pakistan should be at the forefront of that argument, not as a claimant to exceptional treatment, but as a proponent of institutional fairness.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Opinion Desk.
